, what ’ s odd in most ways it was nothing special . The attacker was using this more like a worm , where stolenAttack.Databreachcredentials would be used within the hour to start sending outAttack.Phishinga mass amount of more phishesAttack.Phishing. I 've decided to call this `` Dynamite PhishingAttack.Phishing`` because there is nothing quiet about this at all . It seems about 40 % of the credentials were used for more mailings , and the other account 's credentials had not been used . The initial phishesAttack.Phishingcame inAttack.Phishingfrom a K12 domain from several affected individuals . The email subject was “ You have an Incoming Document Share With You Via Google Docs ” . The contents of the email were base64 encoded , while it appears to be common Content-Transfer-Encoding , it 's not something I typically run into especially when looking at Phishes . The link in the document went to `` hxxp : //bit.ly/2kZJbW3 '' which went to hxxp : //jamesrichardsquest.co.nf/lib The landing page was setup as a generic Outlook Web Access 2013 login page . It appears the EM_Client is a pretty popular email client , but it maybe something you can block on depending on your environment . user-agent : eM_Client/7.0.27943.0 While most people have good protections from Emails coming from external entities into their email environment , many don ’ t push the same protections intra-domain . The volume of email sent fromAttack.Phishingthe Phished accounts to other Internal accounts is what made this so successful